President Buchanan on Secession: 1861

Source: Pacific Commercial Advertiser. Honolulu: Thursday, February 7, 1861.

I should feel myself recreant to my duty, were I to fail to express an opinion on the important subject. The question, fairly stated, is, Has the Constitution delegated to Congress the power to force a State into submission which is attempting to withdraw, or has already withdrawn from the confederacy? If answered in the affirmative, it must be on the principle that the power has been conferred upon Congress to declare and make war against a State. After much serious reflection I have arrived at the conclusion that no such power as been delegated to Congress, or to any other department of the Federal Government. It is manifest, upon an inspection of the instrument that this is not among the specific and enumerated powers granted to Congress, and it is equally apparent that its exercise is not necessary and proper for carrying into execution any one of those powers. So far from especially refused by the Convention which formed the Constitution. It appears from the proceedings of that body, on the 31st of May, 1787, that the clause authorizing an execution of the force of the whole Government against a delinquent State came up for consideration. Mr. Madison opposed it in a brief but powerful speech, from which I shall extract but a single sentence. He observed: "The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound." Upon this motion the clause was unanimously postponed, and was never, I believe, again presented.

Soon after, on the 8th of June, 1787, when incidentally adverting to this subject, he said, any government for the United States, founded on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress; evidently meaning the then existing Congress of the old Confederation.

Without descending to particularize, it may be safely asserted, that the power to make war against a State, is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the Constitution. Suppose such a war should result in the conquest of a State; how are we to govern it afterwards? Shall we hold it as a province, and govern it by a despotic power? In the nature of things, we could not be by physical force control the will of the people, and compel them to elect Senators and Representatives to Congress, and to perform all the other duties of a free State, as a constitutional member of the Confederacy. But if we are possessed of the power, would it be wise to exercise it, under the existing circumstances? The object would be, doubtless, to preserve the Union, yet it would not only present the most effectual means of destroying it, but would banish all hopes for its peaceful reconstruction; besides, in the fraternal conflict, a vast amount of blood and treasure would be expended, rendering future reconciliation between trhe States impossible.